This paper builds a two-stage game model to capture the operations of a dual-channel supply chain consisting of one supplier and two retailers where one of the retailers is constrained by its working capital and the other is not. With this model, we identify the different effects of the capital constraint on the operations of the supply chain and the corresponding profitability in two different (production) technological settings where the marginal cost is constant and increasing respectively. The results show that (1) in the case of a constant marginal cost, the unconstrained retailer's operations and its profitability are independent of the constrained retailer's working capital, while in the case of an increasing marginal cost, the constrained retailer's working capital have a negative impact on the unconstrained retailer's ordering quantity and profitability; (2) the impact of an change in such working capital on the constrained retailer's operations and profitability is regardless to the feature of the marginal cost; (3) in both setting, the supplier and the constrained retailer benefit from an increase in the constrained retailer's operational capital;(4) in the case of an increasing marginal cost, this produces a conflict between the constrained and the unconstrained channels. Managerial insights are also discussed.
Introduction
In recent years, channel conflicts in supply chains are becoming more and more prominent. These conflicts are mainly due to the externalities that one channel makes on the other. For these externalities, a large numbers of studies focus on the market aspect (see, for example, Parka and Keh, 2003; Tsay and Agrawal, 2004; Huang,Yang and Liu, 2013; etc.) . However, this literature al most (implicitly) assumes a cost function with the feature of constant marginal costs. Obviously, when the marginal cost is increasing in the quality, more sales of one channel will lead to a higher marginal cost, then tend to increase the wholesale price in the other channel and thus have a negative impact on the latter. Note further that downstream sales usually are constrained by the amount of working capital. Therefore, intuitively, in a setting where working capital is constrained, the order quantity from a constrained downstream firm would increase in the amount of working capital. When an upstream firm produces with a cost function with the feature of increasing marginal costs, the relaxation of working capital constraints is likely to have a negative externality to the unstrained channel via the effect on the supplier's marginal cost. We address this issue with two-stage game model that describe the operations of a dual-channel supply chain consisting of an upstream supplier and two downstream retailers where one of the retailers is constrained by its working capital and the other is not. We analyze the supply chain in two different setting in terms of constant or increasing marginal cost function. By comparing the equilibriums, we identify the different effects of the capital constraint on the operations of the supply chain and the corresponding profitability in two different (production) technological settings where the marginal cost is constant and increasing respectively. Our paper is related to the literature which focuses on multi-channel supply chain operations with channel conflicts and their coordination. Among these literatures, Parka and Keh (2003) compare the equilibrium under the indirect and vertically integrated channels with the equilibrium under the hybrid channel with respect to the marketing decision variables, particularly pricing and profit distribution 1 . Huang, Yang and Liu (2013) study a pricing and production problem in a dual-channel supply chain when production costs are disrupted 5 . Batarfi, Jaber and Zanoni (2016) investigate the effect of adopting a dual-channel comprised of a traditional retail channel and a direct online channel on the performance of a two-level supply chain 6 .
Giri and Roy (2015) find out the optimal pricing strategies and effort levels of both the direct channel and retail channel using sequential optimization and the Stackelberg game 7 . Xie and Hong (2015) find that there is some certain robustness both in the manufacturer's production quantity and in the offline retail price. When the supply chain is decentralized, the supply chain can be coordinate by changing the wholesale price according to different disruption levels 8 . Dumrongsiri, Fan,Jain and Moinzadeh (2008) develop the conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer share the market in equilibrium, and show that the difference in marginal costs of the two channels plays an important role in determining the existence of dual channels in equilibrium 9 . Dan, Xu and Liu (2012) examine the optimal decisions on retail services and prices in a centralized and a decentralized dual-channel supply chain and evaluate the impacts of retail services and the degree of customer loyalty to the retail channel on the manufacturer and retailer's pricing behaviors 10 . Liu, Cao and Salifou (2015) Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research, volume 33 investigated the effect of risk aversion on the optimal policies of a dual-channel supply chain under complete information and asymmetric information cases 11 . Xiao and Jim (2016) study channel priority strategy of a dual-channel supply chain facing potential supply shortage and examine the effects of coordination/decision sequence of channel priority on priority strategy 12 . Different from the literature discussed above, this paper studies supply chain operations with different cost characteristics in terms of marginal cost and working capital constraints. The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, from the modeling perspective, working capital constraints are incorporated into both supply chain game models with the supplier's constant and increasing marginal cost functions. This complements to the literature that studies these problems in independent manner. Second, we identify the different effects of the capital constraint on the operations of the supply chain and the corresponding profitability in two different (production) technological settings where the marginal cost is constant and increasing respectively. 
The supplier's profit can be written as
The profit functions of retailer 1 and 2 are 
The first-order condition with regard to 1 q implies 
optimal. Otherwise the constraint must be binding, the optimal quantity is 2 2
In stage 1, anticipating the reactions in Lemma 1, the supplier's profit is calculated as Finally, the first-order condition with regard to 1 w implies 
The equilibrium profits of retailer 1 and 2 can be obtained by substituting equation (6) and (7) in equation (2) and by substituting equation (5) and (7) in equation (3) respectively. The supplier's equilibrium profit can be obtained by substituting equation (5), (6) and (7) in equation (1) . These are summarized in Proposition1.
Proposition 1:
In the setting of a constant marginal cost, the equilibrium wholesale price 
Supply chain operations in incremental marginal cost setting
In this section, we replace the assumption of a constant marginal cost by an increasing one.
That is, we assume that the supplier's marginal cost is 2 / 2 C hq = , where 1 2= + . Other assumptions are the same as those in Section 3. This implies that the supplier's profit can be re-written as 
Since both retailers' decision-making problems do not change at all, their optimal reactions are the same as those in Lemma 1. In stage 1,anticipating these reactions, the supplier's profit can be re-calculated as 
The rest of the proof is divided into three steps.
Step 1: we show that for any 1 w , every 1 2 2 < w w is not optimal wholesale price that the supplier offers to the retailer. ( ) < r w w ,the supplier's optimal wholesale price for retailer 2 is 2 1 ( ) r w . However, Step 2: we prove that for any 1 w ，every This optimality implies that if 1 w is chosen, the supplier can obtain a profit of 
We below investigate the impact of 2 K on the operations and the corresponding profitability of the supply chain in the increasing-marginal-cost setting.
Proposition 4:
In the supply chain game model with a increasing marginal cost, for any constant marginal cost, although an increased amount of the constrained retailer's working has a positive impact on the contracted quantity, the wholesale price, the profitability of the supplier and the constrained retailer itself, it does not have any positive or negative impact on the unconstrained channel's operations and its profitability for the retailer. In the case of a increasing marginal cost, the supplier and the constrained retailer benefit from an increased amount of constrained retailer's working capital at the cost of the unconstrained retailer in the sense that the unconstrained retailer buys (sells to final consumers) a smaller quantity at a higher wholesale price and thus get a lower profit. This implies a conflict between the constrained and the unconstrained channels. The reason for this conflict is that the relaxation of the working capital constraint allows for a higher contracted quantity in the constrained channel and thus leads to a higher marginal cost for the supplier who in turn offers the wholesale price to the unconstrained retailer. In a word, a relaxation of the working capital constraint in the constrained channel produces a negative externality to the unconstrained channel via an increase in the supplier marginal cost.
Conclusions
The paper builds a two-stage game model to capture the operations of a dual-channel supply chain and derives the equilibriums in two different settings where the supplier's marginal cost is respectively constant and increasing in its output. By comparing the equilibriums and the corresponding comparative statics, we mainly show that whether the supplier's marginal cost is constant or increasing is a alternative key to understand the conflicts (in the case of the existence of downstream working capital constraints) between two channels. This result complements the market-focusing literature on channel conflicts from a cost aspect: the supplier's increasing marginal cost makes a relaxation of the working capital constraints in one channel provide a negative externality to the channel without any working capital constraint. Finally, this paper assumes that the supply chain is operated in a complete information setting. However, this assumption may not coincide with the reality perfectly. Thus an extension of this research to an incomplete information setting is a valuable work in the future.
